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Abstract
This paper focuses on the influence of the opening of markets of allowances,
such as the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, on the general equilib-
rium of an economy. Assuming there existed an equilibrium before the opening
of these markets, we describe the changes in the firms behavior which guar-
antee that an equilibrium can be reached in the enlarged economy. Hence
we describe under which conditions the economy can undergo the opening of
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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a general equilibrium analysis of an economy undergoing
the opening of markets of allowances. The motivation for such a study comes
from the promotion of greenhouse gases emissions trading as a key instrument
in climate change mitigation policies. A general equilibrium approach on the
issue seems necessary because the amounts of trades on emission allowances
markets may be large enough to influence the whole economy and because
emission trading can difficultly be considered separately from the energy mar-
kets. Also, markets of allowances maintain close relationships with economic
theory as their origin can be found in the Coase Theorem.
The previous general equilibrium literature (see Laffont (21), Boyd and al. (7),
Conley and al. (11) ) has focused on the existence of equilibrium with markets
of allowances, taking the presence of such markets as a fact. We put the
emphasis on the effects of the creation of allowances’ markets. The opening of
new markets is a topic at the frontier of general equilibrium theory. Apart some
recent contributions in the theory of incomplete markets (see Cass and al. (8)
and Elul (14)), general equilibrium models usually consider the set of markets
is fixed. This is emphasized by the assumption of market completeness or in the
Schumpeterian analysis of economic evolution, (24), in which the opening of
new markets is one of the dynamic phenomenon occurring in between, almost
in opposition with, a sequence of general equilibria.
However, it seems to us that the actual creation of markets of allowances for
greenhouse gases emissions, such as the European Union Emission Trading
Scheme (EUETS), raises inevitably the question of the consequences of the
opening of new markets on the existence of a general equilibrium. Taking into
consideration the dynamical perspective imposed by the notion of creation of
a market, we formulate our main interrogation as: “Which additional condi-
tions ensure the existence of an equilibrium in an economy with markets of
allowances knowing that there existed an equilibrium in the economy without
such markets?”
Of course, such a question is relevant only when one can not apply the standard
existence results (in our framework Bonnisseau-Cornet (3) and Jouini (18))
to the economy with allowances’ markets. We argue this is the case. First
it is unlikely that a global free-disposal assumption holds, because when it
wastes part of its inputs a firm may incidentally pollute. Also, firms may
suffer unbounded losses because of the cost of the allowances. Finally, as their
markets are newly opened and as their “legal essence” make them differ from
the other commodities, it seems disputable to posit directly assumptions on
the agents characteristics in the economy enlarged with allowances.
Our analysis is conducted in a framework where the producers behavior is
represented by general pricing rules. This allows us to encompass increasing
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returns to scale as well as competitive behavior. It seems important to encom-
pass both cases as many of the firms subject to the greenhouse gases emissions
reduction schemes are in the energy sector where the presence of increasing
returns is commonly recognized and also because marginal pollution may well
be decreasing. On another hand, pricing rules provide a convenient tool to
represent changes in the firms behavior, after a slight change of perspective
on their interpretation. They are not seen as the local counterpart of a general
principle such as profit maximization or marginal pricing but rather as a set
of constraints on the acceptable prices determining locally the firms behavior.
Concerning the consumption side of the economy, the main particularity of
our model is that agents may face a negative external effect because of the
firms’ pollution. They can purchase allowances as a public good in order to
prevent it.
Our approach to prove the existence of an equilibrium is to posit separately
assumptions on the initial functioning of the economy and on the changes in
the firms’ behavior following the opening of the allowances’ markets. First, we
use standard sufficient assumptions (see (3) and (18)) to ensure the existence
of an equilibrium in the initial economy. Second we give conditions on the
changes in the firms behavior which ensure that a gradual increase in the al-
lowances’ price leads to a general equilibrium for arbitrary initial endowments
in allowances. Accordingly, our results link the range of initial endowments
in allowances for which there exists an equilibrium with the flexibility and
the sensitivity of the pricing rules with regards to the price of the allowances.
Meanwhile we provide a contribution to the theory of general equilibrium with
increasing returns as we indeed prove existence of equilibrium without some of
the standard assumptions such as free-disposability, bounded losses or positive
values of the pricing rules (see Jouini (19) and Giraud (16)).
2 The Model
2.1 Initial economy
We consider an initial economy 4 with a finite number L of commodities la-
beled by ` = 1, . . . , L, n firms indexed by j = 1, . . . , n and m consumers
indexed by i = 1, . . . ,m. This economy is lying within an environment whose
state is described by a vector of E real parameters τ ∈ RE−. The state of the en-
vironment (for example the atmospheric concentrations of various greenhouse
4 Notations: in the latter, RL++ denotes the positive orthant of R
L, RL+ its closure,
S the simplex of RL, S++ its relative interior and H the affine space it spans. Also
e denotes the vector ( 1L , . . . ,
1
L) of R
L. AX denotes the asymptotic cone to the set
X.
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gases) is altered by the production process and influences the consumers wel-
fare. We focus on a situation where markets of allowances for environmental
damages emerge whereas firms were used to pollute freely. Our aim is to study
how the firms should then actualize their behavior in order to let a new general
equilibrium come out. We formalize the situation as follows:
The production possibilities of firms in terms of 1 to L commodities are de-
scribed by sets Yj such that:
Assumption (Initial Production IP) For all j,
(1) Yj is closed;
(2) 0 ∈ Yj;
(3) Yj − RL+ ⊂ Yj;
(4) If , (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1AYj and ∑nj=1 yj ≥ 0 then for all j, yj = 0.
Those assumptions are standard and ensure that, inaction is possible for every
firm, firms can freely-dispose of commodities 5 , free-production is impossible
asymptotically.
As they produce, firms influence the environment. We measure according to
the function fj : RL → RE− the minimal damage caused to the environment
by firm j (we speak of minimal damage because firms may be inefficient and
pollute more than what they actually need to). The actual state of the en-
vironment when the firms choose a production scheme (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj is at
least as bad as
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) (the state of the environment is getting worse as
this parameter decreases). We assume that the pollution function satisfies the
following requirements:
Assumption (Pollution Function PF) For all j, fj : RL → RE− is differ-
entiable, has values in RE− and satisfies fj(0) = 0
In the initial economy, the environment has no economic value so that the
commodities’ price is the only relevant variable for the firms. We let each firm
determine its production’s choices according to a pricing rule φj : ∂Yj → RL+.
That is the price p ∈ RL+ of the commodities 1 to L, is acceptable for firm j
given a production plan yj ∈ Yj if p ∈ φj(yj). Such a behavior coincide with
profit maximization when the Yj are convex and φj is the normal cone to Yj.
We assume
Assumption (Initial Pricing Rules IPR) For all j,
(1) φj has a closed graph.
5 Under this assumption, according to Lemma 5 in Bonnisseau-Cornet (3), ∂Yj can
be endowed with a manifold structure by homeomorphism with e⊥. In the latter we
will consider that this identification holds.
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(2) For all yj ∈ ∂Yj, φj(yj) is a non-empty closed convex cone of RL+ different
of {0}.
Concerning the consumers, they gain utility from the consumption of non-
negative quantities of commodities 1 to L and also are sensitive to the state
of the environment. Their preferences are represented by an utility function
ui defined on RL+ ×RE which associates to a bundle, x ∈ RL+, of commodities
and to an environmental parameter τ ∈ RE, an utility level ui(x, τ). Their
wealth comes from an initial endowment in commodities, ωi ∈ RL++ (we let
ω =
∑m
i=1 ωi) and from an amount ri(pi1, . . . , pin) of the firms’ profits and losses
(pi1, . . . , pin). The private property case where each agent i holds a share θi,j
in firm j profits is encompassed in this setting and will serve as a benchmark.
Those characteristics are assumed to satisfy the following assumptions:
Assumption (C) For all i,
(1) ui is quasi-concave and C
1 on RL++ × RE;
(2) ui is monotonic;
(3) ∀τ ∈ RE− ∀x ∈ RL+ ∀v ∈ RL+\{0} ∃k ≥ 0 such that ui(x+kv, τ) > ui(x, 0);
(4) ωi ∈ RL++;
(5) ri : RL → R is continuous and ∑mi=1 ri(pi1, . . . , pin) = ∑nj=1 pij.
All those assumptions are standard but C(3) which guarantees that a large
enough increase in the consumption of any commodity can always compensate
the deterioration of the environment.
The consumers behavior is then determined by the prices p ∈ RL+ of the
commodities 1 to L as they maximize the utility they gain from consumption
of those commodities, under their budget constraint and taking the state of
the environment as given.
We can then define an equilibrium of the initial economy as:
Definition 1 An equilibrium of the initial economy is a collection (p, (xi),
(yj, tj)) in S++ × (RL+)m ×
∏n
j=1(Yj × RE−) satisfying
(1) for every i, xi maximizes ui(·,∑nj=1 tj) in the budget set
Bi(p, (yj)) := {xi ∈ R`+ | p · xi ≤ p · wi + ri(p · yj)} ;
(2) for every j, yj ∈ ∂Yj, tj ≤ fj(yj) and p ∈ φj(yj).
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1wi.
In order to ensure that there exists such an equilibrium we posit standard
sufficient assumptions for existence of equilibrium with general pricing rules
(see (4), (18)).
On the one hand,we shall assume that the producers follow the marginal pric-
ing rule or some pricing rule with bounded losses.
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Assumption (Initial Standard Pricing Rules ISPR) One of the follow-
ing holds:
(1) For all j, φj has bounded losses: there exist mj ∈ R such that if (p, yj) ∈
S × ∂Yj and p ∈ φj(yj), one has p · yj ≥ mj.
(2) For all j, φj is the marginal pricing rule given by Clarke’s Normal cone
to Yj, that is φj(yj) = NYj(yj) (see (10)).
On the other hand, a survival assumption must ensure that the economy
produces enough wealth in a sufficiently large range of situations.
Assumption (Initial Survival IS) For all ω′ ≥ ω, for all (p, (yj)) ∈ S ×∏n
j=1 Yj such that p ∈ ∩jφj(yj) and
∑n
j=1 yj+ω
′ ≥ 0 one has p·(∑nj=1 yj+ω′) >
0.
Finally, in order to ensure each consumer receives a positive wealth, we posit:
Assumption (Initial Revenue IR) For all (p, (yj)) ∈ S × ∏nj=1 Yj such
that
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi ≥ 0 and p · (
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi) > 0, one has for all i,
p · ωi + ri(p · yj) > 0.
Those assumptions guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in the initial
economy in the sense of:
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions IP, PF, C, IPR, ISPR, IS and IR, there
exist an equilibrium in the initial economy.
Proof: Cf Appendix. This is a consequence of the index formula we proved
in (22), but could also be obtained as a corollary of Bonnisseau (5) and
Bonnisseau-Me´decin (6).
One can note that if the agents wealths are set according to a private property
revenue scheme, the preceding assumptions clearly hold when the producers
are competitive (i.e profit maximizers with convex production sets). More
generally, they hold when the pricing rules are loss-free, i.e for all (p, yj) ∈
S × ∂Yj such that p ∈ φj(yj), one has p · yj ≥ 0. This encompasses the case of
marginal pricing rule when the production sets are star shaped with respect
to 0. Those particular cases are further discussed in the examples’ section.
3 Economies with markets of allowances
Let us now consider that in order to limit the environmental damages due
to production, the government introduces allowances for each environmen-
tal parameter and forces by legal means the firms to use as input in their
production process a vector of allowances corresponding to their actual in-
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fluence on the environment. Namely, when firm j deteriorates the environ-
ment of tj ∈ RE− it must use as input a vector −tj of allowances. Mean-
while the government supplies allowances to the economy by initially allocat-
ing a vector A ∈ RE+ of allowances to consumers and producers according to
a = (a1, · · · , am, am+1, · · · , am+n) ∈ (RE)m+n with ∑mi=1 ai+∑nj=1 aj = A. The
government hence limits the deterioration of the state of the environment to
the level −A. Now, this initial allocation may not be efficient and agents may
gain to trade allowances. Hence markets for allowances emerge. The agents
should modify their behavior in order to adapt to the new market structure.
3.1 Technical changes in the production sector
First, the relevant production set for firm j now is:
Zj := {(yj, tj) ∈ Yj × RE− | tj ≤ fj(yj)}
Note that under Assumptions IP and PF, Zj is closed, contains 0 and satisfies
asymptotically a no free-production condition. However, given our assump-
tion on the pollution function, Zj does not necessarily satisfy a general free-
disposability assumption of the type Zj −RL+E+ ⊂ Zj. Indeed firms may have
to increase their use of allowances in order to dispose of their other inputs:
for example when a firm burns its waste inputs it produces CO2 emissions as
a by-product.
On another hand firms face an additional cost whose magnitude depend on
the allowances’ price q : given a price (p, q) ∈ RL+E and a production plan
(yj, tj) ∈ Zj the profit of firm j is p · yj + q(aj + tj). Firms will consequently
modify their pricing behavior. We shall denote by ψj : ∂Zj → RL+E the
pricing rule adopted by firm j in the enlarged economy. Hence, the price vector
(p, q) ∈ RL+E is acceptable for firm j given the production plan (yj, tj) ∈ ∂Zj
if and only if (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, tj).
3.2 Changes in consumers behavior
The changes which affect consumers characteristics are the modification of
their consumption set 6 which now is RL+E+ and the modification of their
revenue induced by the initial allocation of allowances and the changes in
the firms profits. Given a production scheme (yj, tj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Zj and a price
6 One should pay attention to the fact that even this enlarged consumption set
is not the definition set of the utility function. Indeed the utility depends on the
consumption of commodities xi ∈ RL+ and of the state of the environment which is
a real parameter summarizing the external effects the consumer faces.
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(p, q) ∈ RL+E, the wealth distributed to consumer i now is (p, q) · (ωi, ai) +
ri((p, q) · (yj, tj + aj)).
3.2.1 Private use of the allowance
Now the changes concerning properly the consumers’ behavior depend on their
access to the allowances’ markets. If they do not have access to these markets
as buyers, they behave as in the initial economy: given an environment τ , they
maximize the utility ui(xi, τ) they gain from consumption of bundles xi ∈ RL+
of commodities, under the budget constraint p · xi ≤ (p, q) · (ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) ·
(yj, tj +aj)). In this case, the allowances are only used by firms and as private
goods. Hence we can define an equilibrium with private use of allowances
(denoted for short private equilibrium) as:
Definition 2 A private equilibrium of the enlarged economy is a collection
((p, q), (xi), (yj, tj)) in (S
L × RE+)× (RL)m ×
∏n
j=1 ∂Zj satisfying:
(1) for every i, xi maximizes ui(·,∑nj=1 tj) in the budget set
Bi(p, (yj)) := {xi ∈ R`+ | p · xi ≤ (p, q) · (ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, tj + aj))};
(2) for every j, (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, tj);
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1wi;
(4)
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj +
∑n
j=1 tj = 0.
One can remark that in this framework the equilibrium state of the environ-
ment is exogenously fixed by the government through the initial allocation of
allowances at A =
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj. This initial allocation also has effects on
the repartition of wealth as the freely allocated allowances finally acquire a
value. One should note that private use of allowances is the situation which
prevails in some markets of allowances such as the European Union Emission
Trading Scheme.
3.3 Public use of the allowance
When the consumers access to the allowances’ markets is unrestricted, they
may purchase them in order to prevent their use by the producers and hence
improve the state of the environment. Their purchases benefit the other con-
sumers so that allowances turn out to be public goods. Namely, the utility
of a consumption bundle (xi, si) ∈ RL+E+ for agent i given the quantity of
allowances
∑m
i=1 ai+
∑n
j=1 aj initially endowed to the economy and the quanti-
ties (sk)k 6=i purchased by the other consumers is ui(xi,−(∑nj=1 aj +∑mi=1 ai) +
(
∑
k 6=i sk+si)). Given an environment−(
∑n
j=1 aj+
∑m
i=1 ai)+
∑
k 6=i sk, consumer
i is set to maximize the utility of its consumption bundle (xi, si) ∈ RL+E+ , un-
der the budget constraint p ·xi + q · si ≤ (p, q) · (ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, tj +aj)).
We then define an equilibrium with public use of allowances (denoted for short
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public equilibrium) as:
Definition 3 A public equilibrium of the enlarged economy is a collection
((p, q), (xi, si), (yj, tj)) in (S
L × RE+)× (RL+E+ )m ×
∏n
j=1 ∂Zj satisfying:
(1) for every i, (xi, si) maximizes ui(xi,−(∑nj=1 aj+∑mi=1 ai)+(∑k 6=i sk+si))
in the budget set Bi(p, (yj)) := {(xi, si) ∈ RL+E+ | (p, q) · (xi, si) ≤ (p, q) ·
(ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, tj + aj))} ;
(2) for every j, (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, tj) ;
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1wi;
(4)
∑m
i=1 si =
∑n
j=1 tj +
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj.
At such an equilibrium, the state of the environment is endogenously deter-
mined and depends of each consumer’s purchase of allowances as public goods.
The initial allocation of allowances still influences the repartition of wealth.
4 Changes in the firms behavior and existence of equilibrium.
The existence of an equilibrium in the enlarged economy relies heavily on the
modification of the firms behavior following the opening of the allowances’
markets. Indeed, the producers may consider they can only handle small vari-
ation of the quantity of pollution they cause so that an equilibrium will fail to
exist if the initial allocation of allowances is too low. Also, firms may undergo
important losses because of the cost of the allowances as inputs. This may lead
the revenue of certain consumers below 0 and hence prevent the existence of
an equilibrium.
If one wanted to use standard existence theorems to discard those failures,
one would have to posit assumptions equivalent to those made in the initial
economy (see (5), (6), (22)) . That is:
Assumption (P’) For all j, Zj is closed, 0 ∈ Zj, Zj − RL+E+ ⊂ Zj and if
(zj) ∈ ∏nj=1AZj and ∑nj=1 zj ≥ 0 then for all j, zj = 0.
Assumption (PR’) For all j, ψj has a closed graph and for all zj ∈ ∂Zj,
ψj(zj) is a non-empty closed convex cone of RL+E+ different of {0}.
Assumption (BL’) For all j, ψj has bounded losses or coincide with the
marginal pricing rule.
Assumption (SA’) For all (ω′, A′) ≥ (ω,A) for all ((p, q)(zj)) ∈ S ×∏n
j=1 Zj such that (p, q) ∈ ∩jφj(zj) and
∑n
j=1 zj + (ω
′, A′) ≥ 0 one has (p, q) ·
(
∑n
j=1(yj, zj) + (ω
′, A′)) > 0.
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Assumption (R’) For all ((p, q)(zj)) ∈ S×∏nj=1 Zj such that (p, q)·(∑nj=1(yj,
zj) + (ω
′, A) > 0, one has (p, q) · (ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, tj + aj)) > 0.
However, one has already remarked that the free-disposal condition posited in
P’ is likely to be violated in our framework. This implies that the pricing rules
might not have positive values as required by assumption PR’. The bounded
losses Assumption also is problematic since the cost of allowances used as
inputs may prevent its satisfaction. Hence standard existence theorems may
not be appropriate in our framework.
The alternative we propose is to use as a building block the existence of an
equilibrium in the initial economy. We perturb the corresponding equilibrium
correspondence proportionally to allowances’ price, and then prove existence
of equilibrium in the enlarged economy by showing “existence properties” are
conserved for well-chosen perturbations. The use of this methodology allows to
get rid of the assumptions above mentioned as problematic and to weaken most
of the others but requires the introduction of three non-standard assumptions.
Two of them, Compatibility and Flexibility, link via the pricing rules the
behavior of the firms in the initial and enlarged economies. The other one,
labeled Amenability, guarantee that the demand of firms in allowances will
eventually decrease as the allowances’ prices increase ; we shall prove below it
is implied by bounded losses.
Those additional assumptions should be interpreted as conditions on the firms
behavior (i.e on the pricing rules) which are sufficient to ensure existence of
equilibrium in the enlarged economies, knowing that sufficient conditions for
the existence of an equilibrium were satisfied in the initial economy.
4.1 Stability of the initial equilibrium
First, in order to remain in a workable framework we shall assume that the
newly set pricing rule satisfy the regularity and homogeneity properties com-
monly used in the literature:
Assumption (PR)
For all j, ψj has a closed graph and convex values in RL+E.
Note that we do not assume the enlarged pricing rules have positive values.
Indeed, as mentioned above, the lack of free-disposability makes it doubtful
that such a condition always holds. In particular, it is not necessarily satisfied
in the case of marginal pricing (see the examples’ section).
A second natural requirement concerns the compatibility of the firms behavior
with the one it had in the initial economy:
10
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Assumption (Compatibility)
(1) ∀yj ∈ ∂Yj, one has {p ∈ RL | (p, 0) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj))} = φj(yj)
(2) ∀(yj, tj) ∈ ∂Zj, ∀(p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, tj) such that qe = 0 , one has (p, q) ∈
ψj(yj, uj) for all uj such that
7 uj,e < tj,e.
The first part of this assumption states that when all the allowances’ price
are null it is from the firms point of view as if they were available in arbitrary
high quantity, so that they can behave as in the initial economy. The second
part accordingly states that in the enlarged economy when a given allowance
has a null price, firms do not constrain themselves to use it efficiently.
Compatibility clearly implies that the equilibria of the initial economy coincide
with the private equilibria of the enlarged economy with zero allowance price:
Lemma 1 Assume that for all j, ψj satisfies Compatibility. Then (p, (xi),
(yj, tj)) is an equilibrium of the initial economy if and only if there exist
an allowance allocation ((ai), (aj)) ∈ (RE)m+n+ such that
∑n
j=1 aj +
∑m
i=1 ai +∑n
j=1 tj ≥ 0 and (p, 0, (xi), (yj, tj)) is a private equilibrium of the enlarged
economy.
As a corollary, under Compatibility there can exist equilibria with improved
state of the environment (compared to the initial situation) only if firms are
ready to accept positive prices for the allowance and to modify consequently
their behavior. In this respect let us define:
Definition 4 An allowances’ price q ∈ RE+ is called acceptable for firm j at
yj if there exist p ∈ S++ such that (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)).We shall denote by
Qj(yj) = {q ∈ RE+ | ∃p ∈ S++ s.t (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj))} the set of allowances’
price acceptable for firm j at yj.
The compatibiilty assumption implies that 0 ∈ RE+ is an acceptable allowances’
price. However Lemma 1 implies that if it were the only acceptable price there
could not exist equilibria in the enlarged economy other then the embedding of
the initial equilibria. One hence has to provide the possibility for the enlarged
pricing rule to depart from the initial pricing rules. Rather than giving a
quantitative bound on the suitable amount of flexibility, we introduce a more
behavioral type of assumption which states that a firm is always ready to
adapt locally its behavior to a change in the allowances’ price. Namely, we
assume:
Assumption (Flexibility) For all j, for all yj ∈ ∂Yj, the set Qj(yj) is open
in RE+.
7 vj,e stands for the eth coordinate of the vector vj indexed by j.
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This assumption is satisfied, as well as Compatibility, in the case of marginal
pricing (cf the examples Section) or when the behavior of the firm is deter-
mined by some function depending on the profit (e.g zero profit pricing rule). It
can also be justified by assuming that the enlarged pricing rule is obtained by
adding to the initial one perturbations proportional to the allowances’ price,
that is it is of the form ψj(yj) = {(φj(yj) + νj(q, yj), q) | q ∈ R+}.
This flexibility requirement ensures existence of equilibrium is locally stable
to the perturbation induced by the opening of the allowance market in the
sense of:
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions IP, PF, C, IPR, IS, ISPR, IR, PR, Com-
patibility and Flexibility, there exists a neighborhood of zero in RE+, O, such
that for every allowance price q ∈ O, there exist an initial endowment in al-
lowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ (RE+)m+n such that the enlarged economy has a private
equilibrium with allowances’ price equal to q.
Proof: Cf Appendix. 8
The fact that the allowances’ price turns positive does not necessarily imply
that the state of the environment is improved. Indeed the initial allocation
((ai), (aj)) given by the preceding Theorem may be constant for every q ∈ O.
In order to ensure the economy may undergo positive reductions of its use
of allowances, one must impose further conditions on the influence of the
allowances’ price on the firms behavior.
4.2 On the survival assumption in the enlarged economy
A prerequisite therefore is to ensure that the economic activity remains viable
even though the allowances’ price increases significatively. The new costs in-
duced by the use of allowances as inputs may lead the firms to use less produc-
tive technology for the production of commodities. In turn, this may modify
the value of the outcome of the economic process. The economic activity as a
whole remains viable only if this value remains positive. Mathematically, this
comes to:
Assumption (SA) For all ((p, q), (yj)) ∈ (S × RE+) ×
∏n
j=1 ∂Yj such that∑n
j=1 yj + ω ≥ 0 and (p, q) ∈ ∩jψj(yj, fj(yj)) one has p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω) > 0.
This is a weak form of survival assumption as, contrary to Assumption IS and
SA’, it bears only on the set of attainable allocations. Hence it states that firms
do not actually choose production plans such that the aggregate wealth is zero,
8 In fact, the flexibility assumption may here be weaken to: if 0 ∈ Qj(yj) then
Qj(yj) is a neighborhood of 0 in RE+
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whereas the usual survival assumptions (which bear on a larger set than this
of attainable allocations) posit that the firms do not choose production plans
which would, for even greater resources, lead to a null aggregate wealth. Also
note that SA, oppositely to SA’, concerns only the value of the production in
terms of 1 to L commodities. The allowances do not enter into consideration
here, as at equilibrium no wealth is created or lost because of the operation of
the allowances’ markets. The working of these markets only causes lump-sum
wealth transfers.
Now, assumption SA suffices to guarantee that whatever the allowances’ price
may be, the economic process is beneficial and hence a private equilibrium
may be reached:
Theorem 3 Under Assumptions IP, C,PF, IPR, IS, ISPR, IR, PR, Com-
patibility, Flexibility and SA, for every non-negative allowance price q, there
exist an initial endowment in allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ (RE)m+n such that the
enlarged economy admits a private equilibrium with allowance price equal to
q.
Proof: Cf Appendix.
Remark 1 Theorem 3 can be seen as a result of existence of equilibrium with
fixed price of allowances. Existence of fixed price equilibria are usually obtained
(see Dre`ze (13)) by fixing constraints on supply or demand in the economy.
Here the constraints bear on the initial endowments in allowances.
Remark 2 9 Assumption SA can be obtained in some cases as a consequence
of the initial survival assumption IS. Indeed, if one assumes that firms raise
their output prices in order to compensate the costs of the allowances, then IS
imply SA.
One can also guarantee assumption SA holds if there always exists an output
whose price is positive. This can be seen as a consequence of a general raise
of the output prices in order to compensate the cost of allowances.
Finally, because of the interiority of the initial endowments in commodities,
it is clear that Assumption SA holds as long as the enlarged pricing rules do
not allow for losses on the commodities markets.
4.3 On the revenue assumption in the enlarged economy
Even-though they do not influence the aggregate wealth, transfers occurring
on the allowances’ markets matter because of their influence on the consumers
revenue. Indeed, in order to ensure the existence of an equilibrium, one must
guarantee that each consumer receive a positive part of the aggregate wealth.
9 This discussion is further detailed in the working paper (23).
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This condition may fail to hold when the losses on the allowances’ markets
are not well distributed. In order to prevent this failure, one can extend the
initial revenue assumption to:
Assumption (Revenue R) For all ((p, q), (yj), (ai, aj)) ∈ (S×RE+)×
∏n
j=1 Yj×
(RE+)m+n such that (p, q) ∈ ∩jψj(yj, fj(yj)), and (p, q)·(
∑n
j=1 yj+
∑m
i=1 ωi,
∑n
j=1 aj+∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)) > 0, one has for all i (p, q) · (ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, aj +
fj(yj)) > 0.
This amounts to state there exists an appropriate mechanism of wealth trans-
fer which allocates the firms losses on commodities and allowances’ markets
among consumers.
Note that the initial revenue assumption guaranteed the existence of such
a mechanism for the standard commodities markets only, what is not suffi-
cient to ensure each agent receives a positive wealth for arbitrary allocation
of allowances. Indeed consider a firm which makes a zero profit on the 1 to
L commodities market and uses large quantities of allowances, it is going to
support heavy losses when the allowances prices raise. An agent who owns a
large share of this firm may see its revenue turn negative.
Nevertheless if the government targets precisely the needs of each firm in
allowances so that there is no trade of allowances at equilibrium (that is one has
for all j, aj = −fj(yj)), then there are no losses on the allowances’ markets and
the initial revenue assumption is sufficient to ensure each consumer receives a
positive wealth. Even tough it can be related to the principle of grandfathering,
it is very demanding to consider the government is able to choose the initial
allocations with such accuracy and foresight.
Remark 3 Nevertheless, if one wants to dispense with the enlarged revenue
assumption, one can consider in the following that the government targets
precisely the needs of each firm in allowances (that is one has for all j, aj =
−fj(yj)). Our existence results (Theorems 4 and 5) then remain valid if one
reads “for every aggregate level of allowances” (allocated so that there are no
losses on the allowances markets) instead of “for every initial allocation of
allowances.”
4.4 Existence of Private Equilibrium for arbitrary allowances’ allocation
Finally, in order to obtain equilibria for arbitrary allowances’ allocations, the
firms behavior must be amenable enough to the allowances’ price. Hence we
state,
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Assumption (Amenability)
For all  > 0, for all e ∈ {1, · · · , E} there exist K ≥ 0 such that for every
equilibrium of the enlarged economy (((p, q−e 10 ), qe), (yj)) ∈ (SL+E−1×R+)×∏n
j=1 Yj one has for all j, fj,e(yj) ≥ −.
This assumption, states that when an allowance price is large enough, the only
equilibrium production plans acceptable by the firms are those which generate
an a priori fixed low level of the corresponding pollution. This is satisfied in
particular when the enlarged pricing rules have bounded losses in the sense of
assumption (BL′). Indeed, if Amenability does not hold, one can claim using
Theorem 3 that for every q ∈ R+ there exist an equilibrium at which at least
one of the firms faces losses of the order of magnitude of q (as it actually
purchases more than  allowances at price q while its profits on the other
markets are bounded by compacity).
We can now state our main results on the existence of equilibrium for arbitrary
initial allocations in allowances.
Theorem 4 Under Assumptions IP, PF, C , IPR, IS, ISPR, IR, PR, Com-
patibility, Flexibility, SA,R and Amenatibility, for every initial allocation of
allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ (RE+)m+n, the enlarged economy has an equilibrium
with private use of allowances.
Proof: cf. Appendix
4.5 Existence of Public equilibrium for arbitrary allowances’ allocation
We now turn to the existence of equilibrium with public use of the allowance.
In this framework the demand in allowances of the consumers tends to push
up the prices as soon as the markets open. Hence the analogous of Theorems
2 and 3 do not hold. However, one has:
Theorem 5 Under Assumptions IP, PF, C IPR, IS, ISPR, IR, Compatibil-
ity, Flexibility,SA,R and Amenatibility, for every initial allocation of allowance
((ai), (aj)) ∈ (RE+)m+n, the enlarged economy has an equilibrium with public
use of allowances.
Proof: Cf Appendix.
10 q−e stands for the vector of RE−1 whose coordinates are those of q but the eth ;
fj,e denotes the eth coordinate function of fj
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5 Examples
We shall now discuss to which extent the results stated in the preceding sec-
tions apply to commonly used pricing rules.
5.1 Business as usual
In order to set a benchmark, let us first consider the Business as usual situ-
ation where firms do not modify their behavior following the opening of the
allowances’ markets and where consumers do not have access to these markets.
That is firms keep following their initial pricing rule on the 1 to L commodi-
ties market and then purchase the quantity of allowances they need whatever
its price may be, while consumers are only affected by wealth transfers. In
this framework all the previous assumptions but Amenability hold so that
there exist equilibria for every allowances’ price. However these equilibria in
fact coincide with those one can obtain in the initial economy after a rev-
enue redistribution and hence require a corresponding supply of allowances.
In particular the state of the environment is not improved.
5.2 Global Loss Free
Let us now focus on the case where pricing rules are globally loss-free in the
sense of:
Assumption (Global Loss Free) For all j, for all yj ∈ ∂Yj, for all (p, q) ∈
ψj(yj, fj(yj)), p · yj + qfj(yj) ≥ 0,
then Assumption SA holds. Moreover Amenatibility clearly holds because the
use of a positive fixed quantity of any allowance for arbitrary high price would
entail losses. Hence one obtains using Theorems 4 and 5 :
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions IP, PF,C,IPR, IS, ISPR, IR, PR, Com-
patibility, Flexibility, (Global Loss Free) and R, for every initial allocation of
allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rm+n+ , the enlarged economy has an equilibrium with
public (resp. private use) of allowances.
Note that this encompasses in particular the case of competitive behavior
when the Yj are convex sets containing zero and the pollution functions are
concave. That is to say when the marginal returns are decreasing and the
marginal pollution is increasing.
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5.3 Marginal Pricing and Competitive Behavior
Let us now deal with the case of marginal pricing behavior. That is we consider
the firms follow the marginal pricing rule given by Clarke’s Normal cone (see
(10)) in the initial and in the enlarged economy. This also encompasses the
case of competitive behavior when the production sets are convex.
We restrict attention to the case where the marginal pricing rule is loss-free
in the initial economy, that is we shall posit
Assumption (Star-Shaped) For all j, Yj is 0-star-shaped.
We shall also assume that the pollution increases with the scale of production:
Assumption (Increasing Pollution) For all (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj such that∑n
j=1 yj + ω ≥ 0 (and fj,e(yj) < 0) the application µ → fj,e(µyj) is (strictly)
decreasing.
Finally, we assume that there exist an input whose use does not diminish any
pollution ( what is fairly natural as the use of additional inputs is likely to
increase pollution). In differentiable terms, the assumption may be stated as:
Assumption (Input Increase) For all j, for all yj ∈ Yj, one has for all
λ ∈ RE+, λ′Dfj(yj) 6∈ RL−− 11
This suffices to guarantee the existence of a marginal pricing equilibrium.
Corollary 2 Under Assumptions IP,PF, C, (Star-Shaped), (Increasing Pol-
lution), (Input Increase) and R, if each firm follows the marginal pricing rule
then for every initial allocation of allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rm+n+ , the enlarged
economy has a public (resp a private) equilibrium.
Proof: The marginal pricing rule in the initial economy is given by
φj(yj) = NYj(yj)
and satisfies Assumptions IPR and ISPR.
As mentioned above (Star-Shaped) implies the marginal pricing rule is loss-free
in the initial economy. Together with the interiority of the initial endowments
this ensures the satisfaction of Assumptions IS and IR and the existence of a
marginal pricing equilibrium in the initial economy according to Theorem 1.
Now, in the enlarged economy, the marginal pricing rule is given by (see Clarke
11 λ′ denotes the transpose of λ, Dfj(yj) the jacobian matrix of fj in yj .
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(10)):
ψj(yj, tj) = (NYj(yj), 0)− {(λ′Dfj(yj), λ) | λ ∈ RE+, λe = 0 if tj,e < fj,e(yj)}
and satisfies Assumption PR as well as Compatibility.
Differentiating (Increasing Pollution) one has for all (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj such that∑n
j=1 yj + ω ≥ 0, for all λ ∈ RE+, λ′Dfj(yj) · yj ≤ 0. As the initial pricing
rules are loss-free because of (Star-Shaped), this implies the enlarged pricing
rules do not entail losses on the 1 to L commodities’ markets. Using then the
interiority condition C(4), we can affirm that assumption SA holds.
On another hand (Input Increase) implies that whenever p ∈ S++ and (p, λ) ∈
ψj(yj), there exist p0 6= 0 in NYj(yj) ∩ RL+ such that p = p0 − λ′Dfj(yj).
Hence for  > −λ small enough there exist µ := 1+(λ+)′Dfj(yj)·e
p0·e ≥ 0 such that
p = µp0−(λ+)′Dfj(yj) ∈ S++, so that (p, λ+) ∈ ψj(yj) and λ+ ∈ Qj(yj).
Therefore, Flexibility holds.
Finally, let us focus on the Amenatibility requirement. Let us consider  > 0
and (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj such that ∑nj=1 yj + ω ≥ 0 and fj,e(yj) ≤ −. Due to the
compacity of the set of attainable production allocation 12 , AT , one has:
• m = sup{∇fj,e(yj) · yj | (yj) ∈ AT, infj fj,e(yj) ≤ −} < 0, thanks to the
differentiation of (Increasing Pollution)
• The set sup{∑nj=1 ‖yj‖1 | (yj) ∈ AT} is bounded above and we denote by M
its least upper bound.
Let λe ≥ −2M
m
. Now, assume there exist p ∈ S++ and λ−e ∈ RE−1+ such that
(p, λ) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)). One has p+ λ′Dfj(yj) ∈ NYj(yj), but (p+ λ′Dfj(yj)) ·
yj ≤ M + λem < 0 which contradicts the fact that the marginal pricing rule
on Yj is loss-free. Hence the Amenatibility Assumption holds.
All the necessary assumptions for Theorems 4 and 5 hold. It suffices to apply
those results to end the proof.
Similar results hold for arbitrary pricing rules whenever the (Star-Shaped)
Assumption is replaced by the assumption that the initial pricing rules φj are
loss free and when the pricing rules of the enlarged economy are obtained by
adding the marginal cost of the allowance used as input in the production
process to the initial pricing rules. Namely, one has:
Corollary 3 Assume Assumptions IP ,C, PF , IPR, (Increasing Pollution)
and (Input Increase) hold. If the initial pricing rules φj are loss-free and the
12 See the Appendix, section “Equilibrium Correspondence” for a proper definition.
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pricing rules in the enlarged economy are of the form
ψj(yj, tj) = (φj(yj), 0)− {(λ′Dfj(yj), λ) | λ ∈ RE+, λe = 0 if tj,e < fj,e(yj)},
then for every initial allocation of allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rm+n+ , the enlarged
economy has a public (resp a private) equilibrium.
6 Appendix, proofs
6.1 Foreword
In order to prove existence of an equilibrium in the enlarged economy we can
not use the seminal literature on increasing returns (among others (3) and
(18)) because of the presence of externalities, the lack of free-disposability
in the production process, the value of the enlarged pricing rules outside the
positive orthant (e.g in the case of marginal pricing), and also because losses
on the allowances’ markets may be unbounded. Nevertheless it is easy to
obtain an existence result in the initial economy. Our approach then is to
perturb the equilibrium correspondence of the initial economy in a way such
that new zeroes correspond to equilibria of the enlarged economies. We then
use invariance properties of the degree (see Cellina (9)) in order to show that
there actually exist such equilibria.
6.2 Characterization of consumers behavior
Let us first define the consumers demand. We consider the demand of agent i
in the enlarged economy when the allowances’ consumption is restricted at a
certain level H ∈ RE+ :
Definition 5 The demand of agent i, ∆Hi : RE− × (S++×]− 1,+∞[E×R+ →
RL+E, is the correspondence which associates to a collection (τ, (p, q), w) of
environment, prices and wealth the set of elements:
∆Hi (τ, (p, q), w) = {(xi, si) ∈ RL+×
E∏
e=1
[0, He] | ui(xi, τ+si) = max
Bi((p,q),w)
ui(xi, τ+si)}
where Bi((p, q), w) = {(xi, si) ∈ RL+ ×
∏E
e=1[0, He] | p · xi + q · si ≤ w}.
The restriction of allowances’ consumption below H is a technical trick to
be able to deal simultaneously with public and private use of allowances. In
particular when H = 0, ∆0i is the consumer demand in the initial economy
and at a private equilibrium. This restriction also makes it licit to define the
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demand for negative allowances’ prices. The use of negative allowances’ prices
also is a technical trick which ensure that the equilibria with zero allowances’
price do not lie on the boundary of the domain of the equilibrium correspon-
dence. Under assumption C, Berge’s maximum Theorem ensures that ∆Hi
is non-empty valued and upper-semi-continuous (u.s.c). Moreover thanks to
Assumption C(3) it satisfies the following boundary condition:
For all τ , for all ((pn, qn), wn) converging to (p, q, w) such that w > 0 and
p ∈ ∂S one has for all i, limn ‖projRL((∆Hi (τ, (pn, qn), wn))‖ = +∞.
The wealth of agent i, given prices (p, q) ∈ (S×]−1,+∞[E), production choices
(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj and an initial allocation ((ai), (aj)) ∈ Rn+m+ of allowances is
wi((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) = (p, q) · (ωi, ai) + ri((p, q) · (yj, fj(yj) + aj)).
As this wealth may fail to be positive at some point we introduce following
Lemma 2 in Jouini (18) auxiliary income functions, in order to be able to
define the equilibrium correspondence on a sufficiently large set.
Lemma 2 Let V = {((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) ∈ S++×]−1,+∞[E)×∏nj=1 ∂Yj×
(RE+)m × (RE+)n | (p, q) · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω,
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj +
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)) > 0}
there exist functions r˜i : V → R such that for all ((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) ∈ V ,
(1)
∑m
i=1 r˜i((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) = (p, q)·(
∑n
j=1(yj, aj+fj(yj))+(ω,
∑m
i=1 ai));
(2) for all i, r˜i((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) > 0;
(3) if for all i, wi((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) > 0 then for all i,
wi((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) = r˜i((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)).
Proof: It suffices to set following (18), for all ((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) ∈ V :
r˜i((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj)) = (1− θ(w))
∑m
i=1wi
m
+ θ(w)wi
where w = (wi) = wi((p, q), (yj), (ai), (aj))
and θ(w) =

1, if for all i wi > 0
∑m
i=1
wi∑m
i=1
wi−m infi wi , otherwise
6.3 Proof of Theorem 1
We can characterize the equilibria of the initial economy through the cor-
respondence E0 defined on {(p, (xi), (yj)) ∈ S++ × (RL)m × ∏nj=1 ∂Yj | p ·
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(
∑n
j=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi) > 0} by E0(p, (yj)) =
(proje⊥(
∑m
i=1 xi −
∑n
j=1 yj −
∑m
i=1 ωi),
(xi, 0)−∆0i (
∑n
j=1 fj(yj), (p, 0), r˜i((p, 0), (yj), (0), (0)),
(φj(yj)− p)).

where for all j and all yj ∈ ∂Yj, φj(yj) := φj(yj) ∩ S.
It is a direct consequence of 4.3 in (22) and of the results of Jouini (18)
that under Assumptions IP, PF, C, IPR, IS and IR the zeroes of E0 coincide
with the set of equilibria of the initial economy and that the degree of this
correspondence is non-zero. Hence, there exist equilibria in the initial economy.
This proves Theorem 1.
6.4 Parametrization by the allowance market
The opening of the allowances’ markets influence the commodities’ markets
in two principal ways. First, the firms modify their pricing behavior in func-
tion of the allowances’ price, second the consumers wealth is modified by
the transfers taking place on the allowances’ markets. Those influences might
be represented as parameters influencing the equilibrium on the commodi-
ties’ markets. Hence, we study in the following a parametrized equilibrium
correspondence. The initial allocation of allowances for which there exist an
equilibrium are then determined endogenously as the allocations which clear
the allowances’ markets for some values of the parameters.
The parameter influencing the firms pricing rules is the allowances’ price.
However, we would like to define parametrized pricing rules for every vector
in RE+ (even if this vector is not an admissible allowances’ price for the firm).
Therefore we have to use the following trick. We set for λ ∈ RE+ and yj ∈ ∂Yj :
• γj(λ, yj) = sup 13 {q ≤ λ | ∃p ∈ S s.t (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj))}
• φj(λ, yj) = {p ∈ S | (p, γj(λ, yj)) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj))}
• ψj(λ, yj) = (φj(λ, yj), γj(λ, yj)).
The value of γj(λ, yj) coincide with the allowances’ price whenever the pricing
rule indeed admits λ as a possible value for the allowances’ price in yj. Oth-
erwise it is equal to the largest 14 admissible allowances’ price below λ. Such
an element exists thanks to Assumption Compatibility and because ψj has a
13 This least upper bound is taken with regards to the lexicographic order on RE+.
14 cf 10 supra
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closed graph. The Assumption PR also implies that φj and ψj are u.s.c with
non-empty convex compact values.
Concerning the influence of the allowances’ markets on the consumers wealth,
one cannot represent it using the initial allocation of allowances as a param-
eter because this allocation must be endogenously determined. However at
equilibrium the quantity of allowances used in the economy must be equal
to the initial allocation. Hence in order to endogenize the wealth transfers
taking place on the allowances markets, we implement fictious initial alloca-
tions in allowances as functions of the quantities of allowances used by the
agents. Namely, we consider continuous mappings α : (RE)m+n → (RE)m+n
such that
∑m
i=1 αi((si), (tj)) +
∑n
j=1 αj((si), (tj)) ≡
∑m
i=1 si +
∑n
j=1 tj, and we
interpret (αi(si, tj), αj(si, tj)) as the quantity of allowances allocated to con-
sumers and producers when ((si), (tj)) are the quantity of allowances used by
producers and consumers respectively. Using such a representation, the de-
mands (xi, si) of consumers correspond to a situation where the allowances’
markets are (implicitly) cleared if and only if, (xi, si) ∈ ∆Hi (
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) −
si, p, q, r˜i((p, q), (yj), (αi(fj(yj), (si))), (αj(fj(yj), (si)))). Indeed, agent i usu-
ally makes its choice of allowances’ consumption facing a situation where
the quantity of allowances available for pollution (prior to its consumption)
is A − ∑h6=i sh. Here A is unknown but one knows that whenever the al-
lowances’ markets are clear, A is such that A+
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) =
∑n
k=1 sk, so that
A −∑h6=i sh = ∑nj=1 fj(yj) − si. Hence one sets agent i to make its choice of
allowances’ consumption facing a situation where the quantity of allowances
available for pollution (prior to its consumption) is
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)−si. In the fol-
lowing, we shall abusively let ∆α,Hi ((p, q), (yj), (si)) stand for ∆
H
i (
∑n
j=1 fj(yj)−
si, p, q, r˜i((p, q), (yj), (αi(fj(yj), (si))), (αj(fj(yj), (si)))).
6.5 Equilibrium Correspondence
Under Assumptions IP and C, the set of attainable commodities’ allocations,
{((xi), (yj)) ∈ (RL+)m ×
∏n
j=1 Yj |
∑m
i=1 yj +
∑m
i=1 ωi =
∑m
i=1 xi} is compact.
Hence there exist a compact ball K of RL such that Km+n contains it in its
interior. Let us set U = {((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ (S++×]−1,+∞[E)×(int(K)×∏E
e=1]− 1, He + 1[)m ×
∏n
j=1 ∂Yj | p · (yj + ω) + q ·
∑m
i=1 si > 0},
We can now define an equilibrium correspondence parametrized by (α, λ,H)
by setting: F
(α,λ,H)
1 : U → e⊥ × RE × (RL+E)m × (e⊥)n equal to
(proje⊥(
m∑
i=1
xi −
n∑
j=1
yj − ω), q − λ, (∆α,Hi ((p, q), (yj), (si))− (xi, si)), φj(λ, yj)− p)
F1 is an equilibrium correspondence in the sense of the following lemma:
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Lemma 3 Assume IP, PF, C, IPR, IS, IR, PR Compatibility and Flexibility
hold. Let ((p, q), (yj), (xi), (si)) ∈ (F (α,λ,H)1 )−1(0, 0, 0, 0), such that for all i,
wi((p, q), (yj), αi(fj(yj), (si)), αj(fj(yj), si)) > 0. One has:
(1) if H = 0, ((p, q), (xi), (yj, fj(yj))) is a private equilibrium for the initial
allocation of allowances (αi(fj(yj), 0), αj(fj(yj), 0)) with allowances’ price
q = λ.
(2) if for all i ∈ {1 · · ·m}, si < 15H, ((p, q), (xi, si), (yj, fj(yj))) is a public
equilibrium for the initial allocation of allowances (αi(fj(yj), si), αj(fj(yj), si))
with allowances’ price q = λ.
Proof: Indeed let us consider ((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ (F (α,λ,H)1 )−1(0, 0, 0, 0).
Let us first show that for all j, (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)). First one clearly has q =
λ ≥ 0 and hence p ∈ φj(q, yj). Assume (p, q) 6∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)). Under Compati-
bility and PR, the only possibility is that 16 q >lex γj(q, yj) and (p, γj(q, yj)) ∈
ψj(yj, fj(yj)). As p ∈ S++, Assumption Flexibility then implies there exist q1
such that q >lex q1 >lex γj(q, yj) and (p, q1) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)). This contradicts
the definition of γj(q, yj). Hence one has (p, q) ∈ ψj(yj, fj(yj)).
As consumer i demand of allowances is equal to si and one always has
∑m
i=1 αi
(fj(yj) , (si)) +
∑n
j=1 αj(fj(yj), (si)) =
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) +
∑m
i=1 si, the allowances
markets are clear provided the initial allocation is equal to (αi(fj(yj), si),
αj(fj(yj), si)).
Now, one has proje⊥(
∑m
i=1 xi −
∑n
j=1 yj −
∑m
i=1 ωi) = 0. Walras law and clear-
ance of the allowances markets then imply clearance of the 1 to L commodities
markets.
Moreover, as wi((p, q), (yj), αi(fj(yj), (si)), αj(fj(yj), si)) > 0, the auxiliary in-
comes coincide with the original ones and hence the auxiliary demand coincide
with the original demand of consumer i when his consumption of allowances
is restricted to be below H.
Finally, if H = 0 the demand in allowances coincides with this at a private
equilibrium of the economy.
If si < H, it coincides with this at a public equilibrium of the economy.
6.6 Main Lemma
The proofs of Theorems 2 to 5 are based on the following lemma which shows
that the degree of F1 can be related to the degree of the initial equilibrium
15< in RErefers to the strict inequality coordinatewise
16<lex in RErefers to the strict inequality for the lexicographic order
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correspondence. Indeed, given (α, λ,H) let us consider the family of corre-
spondences F
(α,λ,H)
t : U → e⊥ × RE × (RL+E)m × (e⊥)n defined by
(proje⊥(
m∑
i=1
xi −
n∑
j=1
yj − ω), q − tλ, (∆α,tHi ((p, q), (yj), si)− (xi, si)), φj(tλ, y)− p)
Now, it is clear that under Compatibility, ((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ (F (α,λ,H)0 )−1
(0, 0, 0, 0) if and only if q = 0, si = 0 for all i and (p, (xi), (yj)) is a zero of E0.
Moreover it is clear that whatever may (α, λ,H) be the degree of F
(α,λ,H)
0 is
equal to this of E0 and hence is non-zero according to the proof of Theorem
1.
Finally we show the degree of F0 is equal to this of F1.
Let us consider the following auxiliary survival assumption:
Assumption (SAλ) For all 0 ≤ µ ≤ λ, for all (p, (yj)) ∈ S×∏nj=1 ∂Yj such
that
∑n
j=1 yj + ω ≥ 0 and p ∈ ∩jφj(µ, yj) one has p · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω) > 0,
Lemma 4 Under Assumptions IP, PF,C,IPR, IS, ISPR, IR, PR, Compati-
bility, Flexibility and (SAλ),
deg(F
(α,λ,H)
0 , (0, 0, 0, 0)) = deg(F
(α,λ,H)
1 , (0, 0, 0, 0)).
Proof: Let λ such that SAλ holds. For sake of clarity let us denote Ft instead
of F
(α,λ,H)
t . It is clear that Ft defines an homotopy between F0 and F1. Let us
show that the set ∪t∈[0,1]F−1t (0) is compact. The homotopy invariance property
of the degree then implies the result (see (9)).
Indeed consider a sequence (pn, qn, (xni , s
n
i ), (y
n
j )) ∈ ∪t∈[0,1]F−1t (0, 0, 0, 0). For
all n, there exist tn such that F(tn)(p
n, qn, (xni , s
n
i ), (y
n
j )) = 0.
By construction the transfers on the allowances’ markets are balanced. Hence,
using Walras one obtains that
∑m
i=1 x
n
i −
∑n
j=1 y
n
j − ω = 0. Therefore for all
n, ((xni ), (y
n
j )) lies in the set of attainable allocations which is compact. More-
over one has tn ∈ [0, 1], pn ∈ S, (−1, · · · ,−1) ≤ qn ≤ λ, sni ∈
∏E
e=1[0, He].
Hence (tn, (xni , s
n
i ), (y
n
j ), p
n, qn, ) lie in a compact set and there exists a sub-
sequence converging to (t, (xi, si), (yj), p, q) where t ∈ [0, 1], xi ∈ K and
si ∈ ∏Ee=1[0, He], ∑nj=1 yj + ω = ∑mi=1 xi ≥ 0, (p, q) ∈ S × [−1,+∞[E.
It remains to show that (p, q, (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ U and that Ft(p, q, (xi, si), (yj)) =
(0, 0, 0, 0).
First as ((xi), (yj)) is an attainable allocation, one has xi ∈ int(K).
Second as ∆Hi has values in RL×
∏E
e=1[0, He] it is clear that si ∈
∏E
e=1[0, He] ⊂∏E
e=1]− 1, He + 1[.
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Third as q = tλ ≥ 0 one clearly has q > (−1, · · · − 1).
Fourth as φj is u.s.c, one has, for all j, p ∈ φj(tλ, yj) and, as
∑n
j=1 yj +ω ≥ 0,
Assumption SAλ implies that p·(∑nj=1 yj+ω) > 0. Hence (p, q, (yj), αi((fj(yj)),
(si)), αj((fj(yj)), (si))) ∈ V. This implies the auxiliary individual income,
r˜i, all are strictly positive. Given the fact that x
n
i is bounded, the bound-
ary condition on the demand then implies that p ∈ S++. This proves that
(p, q, (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ U.
Given the continuity properties of correspondences Ft and ∆i, one then has
(xi, si) ∈ ∆i(p, q, (yj), si) for all i and Ft((yj), p, q, (si)) = 0. This ends the
proof. 
6.7 Proof of Theorem 2
Given the compactness of the set of attainable allocations and the upper-semi-
continuity of the pricing rules, it is clear that assumption SAλ holds for all
λ in a neighborhood of zero. Hence one has according to Lemma 4 that for
all (α,H) and for λ in a neighborhood of zero, deg(F
(α,λ,H)
1 ) is non-zero. Let
us then set αj(fj(yj), (si)) = fj(yj) and αi ≡ 0 . For such an α Assumptions
SAλ and IR imply that for all ((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ (F (α,λ,H)1 )−1(0, 0, 0, 0), one
has wi((p, q), (yj), αi(fj(yj), (si)), αj(fj(yj), (si)) > 0. It then suffices to apply
Lemma 3 to end the proof. 
6.8 Proof of Theorem 3
Assumption SA implies SAλ holds for all λ ≥ 0. Hence one has according to
Lemma 4 that for all (α,H) and for all λ ≥ 0, deg(F (α,λ,H)1 ) is non-zero. Now
if one chooses α as in the proof of Theorem 2, it is clear that for all λ, for all
((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ (F (α,λ,H)1 )−1(0, 0, 0, 0), one has wi((p, q), (yj), αi(fj(yj),
(si)), αj(fj(yj), si)) > 0. It then suffices to apply Lemma 3 to end the proof.
6.9 Extended Equilibrium set
In addition to lemma 3, one has:
Lemma 5 If (tj,e), (si,e), 0, z−e) 17 ∈ U is an equilibrium for an initial alloca-
tion ((ai,e)(aj,e), (a−e,i)(a−e,j)), then for every (cj) ∈ Rn+, ((tj,e−cj), (si,e), 0, z−e)
17 We emphasize the coordinates relative to the eth allowance of an element z ∈ U
by writing such an element z = ((tj,e), (si,e), (qe), z−e) Also, we emphasize the initial
allocation of allowance e by writing ((ai)(aj)) = ((ai,e), (aj,e), (ai,−e), (aj,−e)).
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∈ U is an equilibrium for each initial allocation ((bi,e), (bj,e), (a−ei )(a−ej )) such
that
∑m
i=1 bi,e +
∑n
j=1 bj,e =
∑m
i=1 ai,e +
∑n
j=1 aj,e +
∑n
j=1 cj
Proof: The proof is straightforward using Amenability(ii) and noticing that
when qe = 0, a change in the initial allocation of the eth allowance does not
entail revenue changes.
Given a subset of equilibria E , we shall denote by C(E) the subset of equilib-
ria hence extended. That is C(E) = E ∪ (∪e=1···E{((uj,e), (si,e), 0, z−e) ∈ U |
∃ ((tj,e), (si,e), 0, z−e) ∈ E , (uj,e) ≤ (tj,e)})
6.10 Proof of Theorem 4
Let us show that there exist a private equilibrium for every initial endowment
in allowance ((ai), (aj)) ∈ (RE+)n+m. Therefore, let us set :
• αi(fj(yj), (si)) = ai∑m
i=1
ai+
∑n
j=1
aj
(
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) +
∑m
i=1 si)
• αj(fj(yj), (si)) = aj∑m
i=1
ai+
∑n
j=1
aj
(
∑n
j=1 fj(yj) +
∑m
i=1 si).
Under Assumption R and SA it is clear that for such an α, for all λ, for all
((p, q), (xi, si), (yj)) ∈ (F (α,λ,0)1 )−1(0, 0, 0, 0), one has wi((p, q), (yj), αi(fj(yj),
(si)), αj(fj(yj), si)) > 0. So as in the proof of Theorem 3 there exist a private
equilibrium for all non-negative allowances’ price λ with an initial allocation
of allowances made according to α, that is proportional to ((ai), (aj)). It then
remains to show that there exist an equilibrium with aggregate allowances
supply exactly equal to
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj. Hence, in the following we consider
only equilibria corresponding to initial allocations proportional to ((ai), (aj))
and show that there indeed exist such equilibria for all aggregate allowances
supply A ∈ RE+.
More precisely, we shall show by recursion on the allowance index set E, the
following property:
Pe : For all e ∈ {1, · · · , E} there exist equilibria for all aggregate allowance
allocation (A1, · · · , Ae) ∈ Re+ and for all allowances prices qe+1, · · · qE ∈ R(E−e)+
• Proof of P1.
Let a price for all allowances but the first q−1 ∈ RE−1+ be fixed. Let us
then define the correspondence
Eα,0,q−1(q1) = C({z ∈ U | F (α,(q−1,q1),0)1 (z) = 0}),
Let A¯1 = inf{∑nj=1 fj,1 18 (z) ∈ R+ | z ∈ Eα,0,q−1(0)}. According to Theorem
3 and Lemma 5, A¯1 ∈ R and there exist equilibria for all A1 ≥ A¯1.
18 With a slight abuse of notation, given an equilibrium z ∈ U and the corresponding
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On another hand, letK be the bound associated by assumption Amenabil-
ity to  > 0 and e = 1. According to theorem 3, there exist an equilibrium
z ∈ Eα,0,q−1(K). Such an equilibrium satisfies ∑nj=1 f 1j (z) ≤  thanks to
assumption Amenability and hence is an equilibrium for some A1 ≤ .
Now, the correspondence Eα,H,q−1 : R+ → U is clearly upper semi-
continuous thanks to the upper-semi-continuity of the pricing rules and
of the demand correspondences. Therefore according to lemma 2 in (20),
its graph is connected. Using connectedness of this graph of Eα,0,q−1 and
continuity of
∑n
j=1 fj,1, one has that
∑n
j=1 f
1
j (GraphE
α,0,q−1) is connected.
Together with the preceding, this implies that there exist equilibria for all
A1 in [A
1
 ,+∞[.
• Proof of Pe ⇒ Pe+1
The proof proceeds as this of P1 using the fact that the correspondence
E (α,H,(A1,··· ,Ae),(qe+1,··· ,qE) : R+ → U
defined by Eα,H,(A1,··· ,Ae),,(qe+1,··· ,qE))e (qe) =
C({z ∈ U | ∃(q˜1, · · · q˜e−1) ∈ Re−1+ , F (α,(q˜1,···q˜e−1,qe,qe+1,··· ,qE),H)1 (z) = 0,
n∑
j=1
f 1j (z) = A
1, · · · ,
n∑
j=1
f 1j (z) = A
e},
has a connected graph.
To end the proof one just has to let  tends towards zero.
6.11 Proof of Theorem 5
Applying the arguments of theorem 4 to the correspondences Fα,λ,H1 , and to a
K chosen as the maximum between the bound on the allowance price associ-
ated to 
2
given by Assumption Amenability and the supremum on the set of
attainable allocation of the agents marginal utility for the eth coordinate of
the environment 19 , one can show that for all H, one has: for all initial allo-
cation of allowances ((ai), (aj)), there exist equilibria with allowance demand
restricted below H.
However, for every H such that H >
∑m
i=1 ai +
∑n
j=1 aj, it is clear that at such
an equilibrium, each consumer demand in allowance is strictly less than H.
One can then conclude using Lemma 3
equilibrium production (yj) ∈
∏n
j=1 Yj , we let
∑n
j=1 fj,1(z) stand for
∑n
j=1 fj,1(yj).
The same convention apply to
∑n
j=1 fj,e below.
19 Normalized such that the vectors of agents marginal utilities for the commodities
lie in the simplex
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